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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends
beyond initial seizure?

II.

If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth
Amendment protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond
initial seizure should that protection extend?
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JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010. (R. at 16). Petitioner
filed his petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010. (R. at 17). This Court granted
the petition on October 7, 2010. (R. at 18). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1) (2000). A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them are reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the night of September 23, 2008, Fair County police officer John Marlin
(“Marlin”) pulled over Beau Radley (“Radley”) for drunk driving. (R. at 11). After
refusing to take a breathalyzer test, Radley was arrested by Marlin and driven to the Fair
County Police Station. (R. at 11-12). Radley asserts no use of excessive force claim
against Marlin. (R. at 11).
Upon reaching the Fair County Police Station, Radley’s custody was transferred to
Fair County police officer Arthur Goode (“Goode”). (R. at 11-12). Goode removed
Radley’s handcuffs and proceeded with the booking process. (R. at 12).
Once booking was complete, Goode replaced Radley’s handcuffs, but Radley
claimed that the handcuffs were too tight. (R. at 12). Marlin had re-entered the booking
room upon completion of the booking process, and subsequently loosened Radley’s
handcuffs. (R. at 12).
Goode then walked Radley to a holding cell where the two became involved in an
altercation, during which the handcuffed Radley was pushed to the ground and suffered a
cut lip. (R. at 12). This event led to Radley’s filing of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
1

Goode and the Fair County Police Department for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations. (R. at 12).
Radley’s original 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were filed February 1, 2009. (R. at 12).
Goode and the Fair County Police Department filed a motion to dismiss on March 12,
2009, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair granted the
motion to dismiss Radley’s Fourth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (R. at 13); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On March 15, 2010, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
judgment. (R. at 16). On May 15, 2010, Radley filed petition for certiorari, and on
October 7, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the petition to review
two questions: 1) Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force
extends beyond initial seizure; and 2) If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing
seizure to the Fourth Amendment protection against the use of excessive force, to what
point beyond initial seizure should that protection extend? (R. at 17).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I
In cases of excessive force by a state actor, the Fourth Amendment protects
arrestees during seizure, the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees after
seizure and before conviction, and the Eighth Amendment protects inmates after they
have been convicted and incarcerated. However, the circuit courts are split on the issue
of how long the Fourth Amendment protection should apply post-arrest (or, initial
seizure) in cases of excessive force. But, there is nothing in the text of the Fourth
2

Amendment that indicates that “seizure” is anything more than a single act, and this
Court has declined to decide where Fourth Amendment protection ends, or more
importantly, to decide that Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond initial seizure.
To resolve the circuit split, the Court should establish a “bright line” rule ceasing Fourth
Amendment protection against excessive force at the conclusion of the initial seizure.
II
Even if this Court were to allow Fourth Amendment protection against excessive
force to extend beyond initial seizure, the protection should end when the custody of the
arrestee is relinquished by the arresting officer or officers. Of the circuit courts that have
adopted the “continuing seizure” doctrine applying Fourth Amendment protection against
excessive force past the point of initial seizure, the majority have held that Fourth
Amendment protection ends when the arrestee is released from the custody of the
arresting officer or officers, or at the latest when the arrestee has completed the booking
process. Therefore, if this Court were to allow Fourth Amendment protection to extend
beyond initial seizure, the protection should end when the detainee is no longer in
custody of the arresting officer or officers, or, at maximum, with the completion of the
booking process.
ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
state and local governments from depriving citizens of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Congress has enacted legislation to
3

enable persons that have been deprived of their civil rights to bring a federal action
against the state actor that caused the harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). However, the
statute itself is merely the vehicle for enforcement, and the constitutional right infringed
must be asserted and proven to have been violated. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
394 (1989).
The Supreme Court in Graham explicitly declined to determine where Fourth
Amendment protection ends, and Fourteenth Amendment protection begins, post-initial
seizure. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10. The Graham Court also upheld the idea that the
Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard should be used to review cases
of excessive force during the course of arrest. Id. at 1867-68. Yet, some circuits have
adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment protection continues to apply post-seizure,
resulting in a circuit court split. See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir.
1997). Generally said, assertion of a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation
demands that the act done “shocks the conscience.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). Plaintiffs pursuing an action under section
1983 commonly allege a violation of Fourth Amendment rights over Fourteenth
Amendment rights, as an “objective reasonableness” violation of the Fourth Amendment
is not as difficult to prove as is a “shocks the conscience” violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. 386. Though a pretrial detainee exposed to
excessive force should be constitutionally protected, the protection should not pose a
hindrance to the successful administration of law enforcement. Opening-up nearly every
action towards a pretrial detainee by a state actor to “objective reasonableness” review
4

places an undue burden on the judicial system; thus, Fourth Amendment protection
against excessive force should aptly cease with the completion of the initial seizure.
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE SHOULD
END WHEN THE INITIAL SEIZURE IS COMPLETE.
A. “Seizure” is a single act.
The Fourth Amendment only applies to the arrest and not the detaining after an

arrest, as seizure constitutes nothing more than a singular act. Riley, 115 F.3d at 163
(quoting California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991)). Three circuit courts strongly
support this definition of “seizure.” See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir.
1996); Riley, 115 F.3d at 1159; and Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993).
Aside from viewing the text of the Fourth Amendment to decide where its protection
should end, these decisions provide the best-reasoned analyses of why the Amendment’s
protection against excessive force should end with the conclusion of initial seizure.
In Cottrell, the detainee was arrested and died en route to the police station postinitial seizure by “positional asphyxia.” Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1483. Concededly, the
opinion in Cottrell was more focused on issues concerned with interlocutory jurisdiction;
however, the court discussed excessive force and how it should be judged by
constitutional amendment, and indicated that Fourth Amendment protection applied to
excessive force during the course of arrest and no further. Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1492. If
the arrestee had died during the course of arrest, or, perhaps before the police car set out
for the police station, the “objective reasonableness” standard could have applied.
However, Cottrell shows that, even when the alleged wrong only remotely qualifies
5

under excessive force, the Fourth Amendment protection should not apply post-arrest.
Id.
Cases more similar in kind to that at bar also demand that Fourth Amendment
protection be refused post-initial seizure. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161-62. In Riley, the
pretrial detainee had been arrested by one officer, transported to the police station by
another officer, but again released into the custody of the arresting officer (and another
officer), who took him to another county and subjected him to an alleged excessive force.
Id. Similar to Radley’s facts, the events in Riley took place at a location far removed
from the site of the initial seizure. Id. at 1161. The Riley court goes further to explain
that the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper tool to adjudge acts of excessive force
against pretrial detainees, that courts should determine if the excessive force was meant
to “punish” the pretrial detainee, and that this contention is supported by this Court’s
precedent. Id. at 1162 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Perhaps most
importantly, the court acknowledged that arrest and detention are two separate acts
worthy of two separate standards for adjudication. Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975)).
The Fifth Circuit was faced with a set of facts that could be resolved with a brightline rule ending Fourth Amendment protection at the conclusion of initial seizure. See
Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993). In Valencia, the arresting officer of
the detainee had become the Chief Deputy of the county jail after Valencia’s arrest, and
had subjected Valencia to excessive force three weeks after he was incarcerated in the
jail. Id. at 1442. The problems in this case are twofold and show the difficulty posed by
6

the absence of a clear rule establishing a cutoff for Fourth Amendment protection. First,
different jurisdictions have different time periods between initial seizure and formal
arraignment. Id. Second, that it is possible, as in this case, that the detainee could be
subjected to excessive force by the arresting officer, but the force could take place well
beyond the point of initial seizure, and after the arresting officer has relinquished, then
regained, custody. Id. The court, through a succinct and rational discussion, held that
Fourth Amendment protection could not apply after arrest (initial seizure) has been
completed. Id. at 1443-44. In its own words the court opined that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard to review cases of excessive
force occurring against pretrial detainees. Id. at 1445.
B. Those Circuits that have held in favor of “continuing seizure” have done so
with faulty logic.
At least two circuit courts have held that a doctrine of “continuing seizure” is a
proper extension of Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force. See Wilson v.
Spain, 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000) and Barrie v. Grand County, 119 F.3d 862 (10th Cir.
1997). However, their reason for doing so seems unfounded and generally incorrect.
The Wilson court was presented with a set of facts involving an officer’s
accidental “knocking out” of a pretrial detainee in a holding cell just subsequent to the
booking process. Wilson, 209 F.3d at 714. The court based its decision on prior
precedent in the circuit. Id. at 715-16. The court acknowledges that the detainee would
be unable to win a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment standard if he was unable to
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win under the Fourth Amendment; however, the court does little to explain why applying
the Fourth Amendment is proper or legally justified. Id. at 716.
In Barrie, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the issue of a pretrial detainee’s
suicide. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 863. Although the court held that the Fourth Amendment
was applicable in this case to pretrial detainees, the case had nothing to do with excessive
force, and the opinion was primarily focused on conditions of confinement rather than
any claim of excessive force. See id. at 863-68.
The proper constitutional protection afforded to victims of excessive force has
been, on occasion, improperly analyzed because the major concerns of the courts dealt
with other issues, or was only cursorily reviewed because the facts of the case didn’t
warrant a formal analysis of what Amendment to apply. When the major issue of a case
has been what constitutional protection to apply concerning excessive force, great care
has been taken to analyze the factors that influence the timing of certain law enforcement
events and the pitfalls of applying the incorrect constitutional protection. For those cases,
the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force has ceased with the conclusion
of the initial seizure.
II.

IF THIS COURT WERE TO ADOPT A RULE OF “CONTINUING SEIZURE”
IN CASES OF EXCESSIVE FORCE, FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
SHOULD END WITH THE RELINQUISHMENT OF CUSTODY BY THE
ARRESTING OFFICER OR OFFICERS.

A. Even if this Court were to allow the Fourth Amendment protection
against excessive force to extend beyond initial seizure, the
protection should end when custody of the arrestee has been
relinquished by the arresting officer or officers.

8

Of the circuits that have adopted the “continuing seizure” doctrine, many have
been reluctant to extend the protection to pretrial detainees subjected to excessive force
once the detainee has left the custody of the arresting officer or officers. See Torres v.
City of Madeira, 524 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th
Cir. 1988); and Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1989). If this Court were to
also adopt the “continuing seizure” doctrine, the decisions of these circuits should be the
guide in determining where Fourth Amendment protection should end.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Torres was supported by Ninth Circuit precedent
and a broadening of this Court’s opinions. Torres, 524 F.3d at 1056. A seizure continues
while the detainee remains in the custody of the arresting officers. Id. (quoting Robins v.
Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985)). Fourth Amendment protection continues to
apply when the detainee is in the custody of the arresting officer. Id. (quoting Fontana v.
Haskin, 262 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2001)). In the case of Torres, the excessive force
concerned a mistake on the part of the officer in drawing her pistol rather than her Taser;
however, the Fourth Amendment was held to be the correct standard of analysis since the
detainee was still, by the court’s analysis, seized. Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79 (1987) and Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)). The Torres decision does
not necessarily negate that initial seizure is a single act, it merely shows that the act of
initial seizure can take several moments in time to complete. Id. From this perspective a
“continuing seizure” analysis is appropriate, and deserving of Fourth Amendment
protection.
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In McDowell, the court based its decision to apply the Fourth Amendment based
on pre-Graham Supreme Court precedent. McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1305 (citing
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (where a suspect had fled from arrest and was
shot by a police officer)). The action was held to be unreasonable, and thus adjudged by
the Fourth Amendment standard. Id. However, the court acknowledged that there was a
dispute as to which Amendment, the Fourth or Fourteenth, should apply. Id. at 1306.
The case does not suggest that Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force
should extend to detainees post-initial seizure, but that apprehending a fleeing suspect
was actually part of initial seizure. Id. at 1305.
Like the facts of the case at bar, the basis for the excessive force complaint in
Powell occurred at the police station and after the booking process was complete.
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1041. However, the detainee was subjected to the excessive force,
unlike in Radley’s case, at the hands of the arresting officer (and several other officers).
Id. The Powell court went into some discussion about the holding of Graham and its
decline to determine where Fourth Amendment protection ends, but ultimately based its
determination to use the Fourth Amendment to guide its decision on a previous Second
Circuit case. Id. at 1044 (citing Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.
1989) (Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force applied to detainee that was
handcuffed and left for hours on the floor of his home)). Though the Fourth Amendment
should not be applied post-initial seizure, and the reason for applying the Fourth
Amendment to the facts of the Powell case is an extension of the rule, the Powell
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decision at least draws the line of application to those detainees that remain in the
custody of the arresting officer or officers.
B. Some Circuits hold that Fourth Amendment protection should apply up to
formal arraignment; however, the reasons for doing so lack legal merit.
The primary problem with applying the Fourth Amendment up to arraignment is
that certain factors could prevent the detainee from promptly being arraigned. This could
be, for instance, due to an extended hospital stay to treat wounds suffered during an arrest
or some incident immediately subsequent to initial seizure. The question, then, is should
a detainee that has left the custody of the arresting officer for a situation such as this
resume the Fourth Amendment protection once he or she is put back in the custody of the
arresting officer or another officer of the law?
Furthermore, it is likely that some jurisdictions will differ in the statutorily
prescribed time before subjection to formal arraignment. In Radley’s case, there is no
statutory provision that dictates the latest a detainee must be taken for arraignment. DM
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.07 (West 2010). Thus, if this Court were to adopt a rule
allowing the Fourth Amendment to apply up to arraignment, just as much ambiguity of
application would continue as is present now, rather an establishment of a “bright line”
holding to cease the application of the protection upon completion of initial seizure or
when the detainee is passed from the custody of the arresting officer or officers.
Looking first to Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth
Circuit noted it was confronted with an “analytical snarl” regarding what Amendment,
the Fourth or Fourteenth, should apply. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1158. The Tenth Circuit
11

acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment applies during arrest, but grappled with the
idea that Fourth Amendment should apply post-initial seizure. Id. at 1159 (citing
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10). The court ultimately reached its decision to use the
Fourth Amendment up to formal arraignment. Id. at 1162. However, it did so after citing
a series of authority from other jurisdictions that do not support the idea. Id. at 1159.
Later discussing that the Fourth Amendment governs initial arrest, due process covers
excessive force after initial arrest. Id. at 1162. Thus, the primary reason for applying the
Fourth Amendment up to arraignment is to cover the reasonableness of the prearraignment detention. Id. at 1162-63.
Returning to the decision of Barrie, the court held that Fourth Amendment
protection should extend up until formal arraignment. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 869-70.
Barrie concerned a detainee that had been arrested without a warrant and subsequently
committed suicide while awaiting arraignment in a jail’s “drunk tank.” Id. at 863-64.
The court distinguished its case from that of Austin since it involved a jail suicide, and
not excessive force. Id. at 866. (citing Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th
Cir. 1991)). Therefore, Barrie would also be distinguished from the case at bar.
Ultimately, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper amendment to
address issues of “deliberate indifference” towards pretrial detainees. Id. at 868-69. The
Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard to judge “deliberate indifference” in cases
such as this, but by that rationale the Fourteenth Amendment would also provide the
proper test to view “excessive force.” One civil rights infraction (“deliberate
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indifference”) is merely the mirror image of the other civil rights infraction (“excessive
force”) and is no less of an infraction than the other.
In Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that the
Fourth Amendment applies up through probable cause hearings. Id. at 866. However,
the court held this by extending its earlier holdings applying Fourth Amendment
protection up through the booking process. Id. Even the facts of the case don’t warrant
the extension, as the excessive force occurred during the booking process, and did not
present the court with a fact situation showing the need for the Fourth Amendment
protection to extend to probable cause hearings. Id. at 867.
C. At least two Circuits have refused to decide where Fourth Amendment
protection against excessive force ends, applying a case-by-case rule,
which should be rejected.
Both the Third and Eighth Circuits have not indicated where exactly Fourth
Amendment protection against excessive force should end post-initial seizure. See
United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 1997), and Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d
713 (8th Cir. 2000). The two Circuits essentially turn to the facts of each case presented
to determine if Fourth Amendment protection applies. Though this idea is presented as a
realistic approach to solving problems, it complicates how cases should be viewed and
ensures that efficient and economical justice is missed.
In Johnstone, a police officer was accused of excessive force against several
detainees. Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 202-03. In the excessive force counts discussed by the
court, all action had been taken after the detainees were in handcuffs, and thus after the
arrests of the detainees and not at initial seizure. Id. at 204. However, rather than
13

applying the “continuing seizure” doctrine, the court stated that they would not decide
where seizure ends and pretrial detention begins. Id.
The Wilson court faced the question of what Amendment to apply, but essentially
focused its opinion on the facts of the case and the remote circumstances that brought the
case to bar. See Wilson, 209 F.3d 713. In Wilson, the detainee had been arrested,
booked, and accidentally knocked unconscious by the arresting officer when he attempted
to enter the holding cell and bring the detainee to order. Id. at 714. At most, the
“arresting officer” rule could apply, but not a holding of the Fourth Amendment
applicable up until formal arraignment.
CONCLUSION
The Circuit courts are split as to how long to apply Fourth Amendment protection
of pretrial detainees in cases of excessive force, where the act occurs post-initial seizure.
And, though state laws can and should be able to vary under our form of government,
Congress enacted legislation to allow those subjected to excessive force by government
officials to pursue a remedy in federal court. This fact in of itself should be compelling
for the Court to prescribe a bright line standard as to when, and when not, the Fourth
Amendment should apply.
In viewing the issue from the perspective of the text of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and furthermore from well-reasoned Circuit decisions that have held that
the Fourth Amendment should cease to apply once initial seizure is complete, it is a
stretch to allow the Fourth Amendment to extend past “seizure,” when seizure has been
shown to be a single act. Those subjected to excessive force should certainly be
14

protected under the Constitution; however, ample protection exists under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and no logical reason exists to broaden the scope past what the
Amendments were originally intended to accomplish. In conflicting decisions, the
concept of continuum still exists: initial seizure leads to pretrial detention leads to formal
arraignment leads to conviction. The Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness”
standard protects against excessive force during the initial seizure, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “shocks the conscience” standard protects against excessive force during
the pretrial detention period, and the Eighth Amendment protection against “cruel and
unusual punishment” exists to protect the convicted from excessive force.
If, however, the Court were to look to the ambiguous situations occasionally
encountered during arrest and adopt a “continuing seizure” rule, the Fourth Amendment
protection against excessive force should at least end when the arresting officer or
officers relinquishes custody of the arrestee. Holding otherwise would invariably flood
the courts with assertions of Fourth Amendment violations, and though the detainees
would be further protected, state officers would be unduly hindered in their
responsibilities. Creating avenues of protection for some should not come at the
unreasonable expense of others.
Finally, if the Court were to broaden the rule and allow Fourth Amendment
protection to extend past initial seizure, and past the relinquishment of custody from the
arresting officer or officers, the protection should not extend past the completion of the
booking process. Though timing between arrest and booking can be influenced by a
number of factors, the majority of booking processes occur in a reasonable time after the
15

initial seizure has concluded. Formal arraignment, on the other hand, can vary greatly
between jurisdictions. Thus, holding Fourth Amendment to apply up until formal
arraignment is just too broad of a rule.
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PRAYER
For the reasons stated above, Respondents pray that this Court affirm the decision of
the court below.

__________________________
Counsel for the Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Counsel for Respondents certifies that this brief has been prepared and served on
all opposing counsel in compliance with the Rules of the Freshmen Moot Court
Competition.

__________________________
Counsel for the Respondents
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APPENDIX
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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